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Introduction 
On the 30th of June 2011, the German parliament (Bundestag), with cross-party 
consensus, made the decision to enact a nuclear phase-out for Germany. As this 
decision marks a remarkable political shift, it must be interpreted as a direct response to 
the nuclear disaster that occurred in Japan in March of 2011. The same parliament had 
made the opposite decision only six months prior, calling for an extension of German 
nuclear power plants runtime. This raises the following question: Why did such a 
fundamental political change occur in Germany while several other countries continued 
and even extended nuclear plans? To understand this political shift in Germany, it is 
necessary to investigate public debate surrounding nuclear energy in the media and its 
effects on public opinion. Analysing this specific case, we will discuss general 
questions and conditions concerning media effects on public attitudes. 
We will first review factors that can either limit or evoke strong media effects on 
attitudes from a theoretical perspective and discuss whether such factors were 
predominant in Germany when the Fukushima disaster occurred. The second section 
includes a literature review on nuclear power in the media and in public opinion to 
derive our research questions. We will then present the methodology and findings of 
two studies. In the first study, two content analyses were performed, in 2010 and 2011, 
on nuclear power media coverage in Germany. In the second study, we examine attitude 
changes caused by the Fukushima accident using a suitable panel survey on energy-
related attitudes. The first survey wave was carried out immediately before the German 
nuclear runtime extension was enacted in September of 2010, and the second was 
conducted two months after the Fukushima accident had happened in 2011. Using the 
  
data of the participants who participated in both waves (n=341), we examined whether 
attitude changes had occurred.  
Preconditions of persuasive media effects 
In pluralistic democracies, the media system is independent and uncontrolled by the 
state or by economic stakeholders. As numerous political and societal actors strive to 
promote their positions, a certain variety of published opinions can be obtained. This 
variety hinders persuasive media effects, as it allows individuals to avoid messages that 
are not in line with their existing attitudes and that may provoke cognitive dissonance 
(Festinger, 1957). A second factor that limits or modifies persuasive effects includes 
social embedding and social influence effects on individuals via interpersonal 
communication networks or opinion leaders in their personal environment 
(Boomgaarden, 2014). A third factor that moderates persuasive media effects concerns 
audience characteristics, such as interests, motives, involvement and information 
processing (e.g., Petty, Brinol, & Priester, 2009; Rubin, 2009).   
In contrast to factors that hinder or modify persuasive media effects, several novel 
approaches support the notion of strong media effects and therefore serve as the 
theoretical basis for our study. A key model on media effects in modern societies is 
Ball-Rokeach and DeFleur’s (1976) dependency model of media effects. The authors 
argue that in modern societies, dependency on media information is necessary for 
individuals’ awareness of global affairs. Research shows that this dependency increases 
in times of social conflict and following the occurrence of unexpected events such as 
natural disasters or accidents. Under such circumstances, ‘the potential for mass media 
messages to achieve a broad range of cognitive, affective, and behavioral effects will be 
increased’ (Ball-Rokeach & DeFleur, 1976: 7). These authors’ description of media 
dependency closely reflects conditions in Germany when the Fukushima tsunami 
  
occurred. The unexpected accident evoked a national debate on nuclear energy usage, 
and the media served as the main source of information on this issue. The media 
dependency model can thus explain why strong media effects could be expected in this 
particular case.  
Another response to the lack of empirical support for the model of strong media effects 
is Noelle-Neumann’s (1973) approach. She identified three relevant factors that 
facilitate strong effects, as follows: consonance, ubiquity and cumulation. Consonance 
refers to situations in which mainstream media outlets present and evaluate a 
controversial issue in a consonant way. Although consonance is uncommon in 
pluralistic media systems, certain topics may still be covered consonantly in such 
systems. As the bandwidth of problem definitions and evaluations published by the 
media is largely determined by the spectrum of political opinions represented in a 
political establishment (i.e., indexing, Bennett, 1990), consonance is prevalent when 
major political actors agree regarding the interpretation of a political problem. As an 
effect of media consonance, audiences will more likely be influenced by the dominant 
worldview presented by the media, as alternative interpretations are not available. 
Furthermore, a limited spectrum of opinions may also affect peoples’ willingness to 
speak out (i.e., spiral of silence, Noelle-Neumann & Petersen, 2004). Depending on 
whether one’s opinion lies inside or outside of the spectrum of published opinion, one 
will be confronted less or more often with arguments that are consonant or dissonant to 
one’s own political opinion. If published opinion is predominantly dissenting, fear of 
isolation increases and the willingness to voice one's own personal opinion in public 
decreases. Dominant problem definitions can thus also shape the content of 
interpersonal communication, increasing the ubiquity of a specific worldview even 
further (Noelle-Neumann & Petersen, 2004). 
  
Cumulative effects are considered in numerous novel theories on media effects. A 
prominent example is the agenda-setting approach, which postulates that the frequency 
of media coverage on an issue influences the perceived importance of this issue to the 
public. Furthermore, it is assumed that the selection of issues (first level agenda setting) 
and especially the selection of attributes (second level agenda setting) will influence 
public opinion (McCombs & Reynolds, 2009). Research on agenda setting shows that 
effects can be observed almost exclusively for unobtrusive issues, or issues that 
individuals do not have first-hand experiences with (Zucker, 1978). Ball-Rokeach and 
DeFleur (1976) would state that this situation reflects high media dependency.  
If Noelle-Neumann (1973) is correct, we can expect strong media effects if media 
coverage on nuclear energy following the Fukushima accident was consonant, intense 
and omnipresent in all media channels. It is thus necessary to examine the amount and 
content of coverage provided through a broad range of media sources.  
Nuclear power in the media and in public opinion  
The following section provides a literature review on media coverage and public 
opinion on nuclear power. Given the focus of this paper, we predominantly focus on 
research on Germany. First, we will present content analysis and survey results for the 
period preceding the Fukushima accident. Then, we will discuss international findings 
on attitude changes towards nuclear power as a result of the Fukushima accident, which 
are referred to as Fukushima effects.  
Media coverage on nuclear power prior to the Fukushima accident 
To date, only a few long-term studies have examined developments and changes in 
media coverage on nuclear power (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Kepplinger, 1988; 
Overhoff, 1984). In the 1950s and 1960s, the media highlighted positive societal, 
  
technological and economic development fostered through civilian uses of nuclear 
power (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989). However, with the rise of social movements in 
the late 1960s, the thematic focus and evaluation changed. Since then, a negative trend 
in the German press has induced a fundamental re-evaluation of nuclear power 
(Kepplinger, 1988). According to Gamson and Modigliani (1989, p. 16), similar trends 
can be observed in the US, where the media focused more heavily on public 
accountability, the promotion of environmentally friendly alternatives and the low cost-
effectiveness of nuclear power. Later, in the context of the oil crisis of the early 1970s, 
atomic energy was evaluated positively once again. In German and US media outlets, 
the oil crisis was exploited to promote national energy independence through the use of 
nuclear energy (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Kepplinger, 1988). However, following 
this intermezzo, the previous negative trend continued. According to the results of 
Overhoff (1984), the German press began to cover environmental risks of nuclear power 
and conflicts between the antinuclear movement and the police more intensively. These 
critical views were reinforced further in both countries following the nuclear accidents 
of Three Miles Island (TMI) and Chernobyl in 1979 and 1986, respectively.  
Interestingly, studies that examined immediate media responses to these nuclear 
accidents revealed that the negative evaluation of nuclear energy was not reinforced. 
Teichert (1987), in examining German media coverage in the first two weeks following 
the Chernobyl accident, found radiation exposure to be the most prominent issue 
discussed in media coverage on the accident. However, it was covered with a rather 
benign rather than alarming tone. Only four percent of all news items noted any risks 
due to radiation. Stephens and Edison (1982), who analysed the US media coverage 
released in the first week following the TMI accident, drew similar conclusions. The 
authors noted that the media did not use the accident to cast doubt on the security of US 
nuclear power plants in general (Stephens & Edison, 1982, p. 201). Furthermore, 
  
Friedman et al.’s (1987) findings show that even after the Chernobyl accident, no re-
evaluation of radiation exposure took place. Although US media discussed radioactive 
radiation more often after the accident, the tone remained fairly subdued. 
Since the 2007 release of the Stern Report on consequences of climate change, a 
number of political actors have begun to reframe nuclear power as an effective 
instrument for tackling climate change. Doyle (2011) analysed the British news 
coverage from 2005 to 2008 and found that the media initially resisted the government’s 
attempt to reframe atomic energy. However, all newspapers eventually adopted the 
political discourse and accepted the notion that pursuing nuclear energy is less risky 
than provoking climate change through the use of fossil fuel resources. Similar findings 
were obtained by McGaurr and Lester (2009), who examined debates on risks of climate 
change versus those of nuclear power presented in the Australian press from 2005 to 
2007. After the Australian Prime Minister declared climate change to be a national 
threat in May of 2006, the media began to frame nuclear power as a technical solution 
to climate change in Australia (McGaurr & Lester, 2009, p. 183). In the German media, 
this political reframing can be observed in the government’s attempt to legitimize the 
extension of German nuclear power plants in 2010 (Arlt, 2013).  
To understand media effects on attitudes, it is necessary to not only know which 
thematic aspects were emphasised in the media and how they were evaluated but also 
which actors advocated for nuclear energy and which held a critical stance. The effects 
of a message depend not only on its content but also on its author. The results of various 
studies on German media coverage show consistently that the positions of political 
actors were cited in the German media. Overhoff (1984) found that politicians were 
mentioned in more than half of all articles, antinuclear activists and citizens' initiatives 
were mentioned as relevant actors in only one-third of all articles, and industrial actors 
followed in third place. Trade unions and scientists were hardly ever mentioned in the 
  
media. Kepplinger (1988) notes that public opinion in Germany was shaped decisively 
by politicians and statements made by journalists. In addition, Teichert (1987, p. 198) 
found that after the Chernobyl accident, national politicians took centre stage in the 
media. Through their engagement, they attempted to counteract the German 
population’s growing mistrust of nuclear power. Taken together these studies clearly 
indicate that political actors play an important role in coverage on nuclear energy. 
However, no findings concerning the actors’ party affiliations are available. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the majority of content analyses on nuclear power 
were conducted in the context of events such as the TMI and Chernobyl accidents and 
therefore only analysed short periods. With the exception of these case studies, few 
studies examined media coverage over longer periods or studied nuclear power in a 
broader context of climate and energy politics, as a number of more recent studies do 
(Arlt, 2013). Several studies showed that both thematic aspects (attributes) and 
tendencies vary according to political and historical contexts. Findings on actors who 
expressed opinions on nuclear power showed that representatives of political 
administrative systems played an especially dominant role. Given the inherent political 
aspects of the issue, it can be assumed that media debates on nuclear power following 
the Fukushima accident will remain more political than economic or scientific.   
Based on these assumptions and the above-listed content analysis, we developed 
categories that measure thematic aspects, tendencies, and actors and pose the following 
three research questions: 
RQ1: How frequently and consonantly did the media cover the issue of nuclear energy? 
RQ2: Has media coverage on thematic aspects of nuclear power changed since the 
Fukushima accident? 
  
RQ3: Have actors covered by the media changed their positions and arguments 
surrounding nuclear power since the Fukushima accident?  
Public opinion on nuclear power in Germany prior to the Fukushima accident 
Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Research and Eurobarometer data offer insight 
into German attitudes on nuclear power prior to the Fukushima accident. In 2005, 
approximately 64 percent of Germans were convinced that German nuclear power 
plants were safer than those of other countries, and less than half of the population 
(46%) feared a nuclear accident. Approximately half of Germans believed that nuclear 
energy is cheap and economical (51%) and helps to preserve fossil energy resources 
(52%). However, the German population also recognised several problems. 
Approximately 80 percent realised that nuclear energy usage creates nuclear waste, and 
another 72 percent were aware of the unsolved nuclear waste disposal issue in Germany 
(Schulz, 2006). Findings from a secondary analysis of the German sample (n=1537) of 
the 2009 Eurobarometer survey data show that attitudes on nuclear energy were strongly 
influenced by assessments of risks and cost effectiveness. Respondents with positive 
evaluations of security and cost effectiveness cited more arguments that supported 
extended nuclear energy usage (Arlt, 2013). Findings from an Allensbach survey that 
was carried out in March 2010 showed that even shortly before the parliament enacted 
the runtime extension, the population remained divided on the issue. Specifically, 37 
percent of the German population opposed and 44 percent advocated nuclear power. 
However, only a minority (31%) believed that the runtime extension was a good 
proposal, while 43 percent did not (Petersen, 2010). In sum, these results indicate that 
German public opinion on nuclear power remained divided even while overall 
representations of nuclear power were predominantly positive. 
Fukushima effects 
  
A number of studies examined the effects of the Fukushima accident on attitudes 
towards nuclear power. For example, a few days after the Fukushima accident, WIN-
Gallup International (2011) carried out a global snap poll of 47 countries to analyse the 
event’s impact on public opinion. Respondents were asked to report their views of 
nuclear energy before the accident occurred and how their views have changed. The 
findings reveal a global shift in public opinion. Before the accident, 57 percent were in 
favour of using nuclear power, and after the event, this value was reduced to 49 percent. 
Vogel (2014) examined the influence of the Fukushima accident on peoples’ attitudes 
towards risks and the environment using data from the ISSP 2010 - Environment III. As 
the survey was conducted in certain countries before the Fukushima accident and in 
others after the event, he observed Fukushima effects through a comparison of these 
two groups. The results show that risk perceptions and environmental awareness levels 
were clearly higher following the Fukushima accident. Using independent survey data 
from before and after the Fukushima accident, Huang et al. (2013) examined changes in 
the public’s risk perception and acceptance of nuclear power plants in China. The 
authors found that perceived risk levels increased while public acceptance levels 
decreased significantly. Two panel data studies from Italy and Switzerland reveal 
significant attitude changes at the individual level. Prati and Zani’s (2013) study shows 
a decline in nuclear trust and pronuclear attitudes. However, the sample included 32 
participants and, thus, was very small and unrepresentative. Siegrist and Visschers 
(2013) examined effects of the Fukushima accident on acceptance of nuclear power and 
on evaluations of different nuclear phase-out scenarios using panel data of n=463 
individuals. Although the results revealed a negative Fukushima effect on nuclear 
power acceptance, in general, the level of acceptance remained relatively stable and 
high. Regarding the evaluation of various nuclear-phase-out scenarios, the results 
underline the importance of participants’ pre-Fukushima attitudes towards nuclear 
power. 
  
Overall, previous studies on attitude changes caused by the Fukushima accident 
revealed that the event may have changed public opinion on nuclear power. 
Nevertheless, the existing research on Fukushima effects is limited. While Siegrist and 
Visschers’ (2013) study based on a panel survey best reflects our approach, the authors 
do not discuss or analyse the role of the media coverage and use. Most studies relied on 
cross sectional data; thus, they are unable to identify attitude changes at the individual 
level, which leads us to our fourth research question: 
RQ4: Have people’s attitudes towards nuclear power changed since the Fukushima 
accident? 
If such attitude changes can be observed, questions arise regarding how to explain 
individual differences in the level of change.  According to the risk communication 
perspective, especially in times of crisis, the media plays an important role as an 
information source (Pidgeon et al., 2003). In the case of the Fukushima accident, the 
media served as nearly the sole source of information on this issue among German 
residents. Hence, the amount of news media exposure may have influenced attitude 
changes. Furthermore, it is known that attitudes towards nuclear power are influenced 
by sociodemographic characteristics and basic political and energy-related attitudes 
(Arlt, 2013). However, it is unclear whether these factors also affect attitude changes. 
This leads us to our final research question: 
RQ5: Which factors can explain changes in attitudes towards nuclear power? 
To answer our research questions regarding changes in media coverage, data from two 
content analyses were used (study 1). In addition, data from two panel surveys were 
used to study changes in attitudes towards nuclear power (study 2). The following 
section presents the content analysis and survey methodologies and findings.  
  
Study 1: Changes in media coverage on nuclear power 
Methods and data 
To answer the first three research questions, two quantitative content analyses were 
conducted. The media sample included seven information sources, as follows: the three 
most popular German evening newscasts (ARD Tagesschau, ZDF heute and RTL 
Aktuell); the two highest circulation and most influential national newspapers 
(Süddeutsche Zeitung and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) and, given the regional 
focus of the project, the two most widely read local newspapers (Thüringer Allgemeine 
and Freies Wort). The first analysis covered the eight-week period preceding the 
German parliament nuclear power plant runtime extension (10/07/2010 to 04/09/2010). 
For this time period, all news items that mentioned either the runtime extension or the 
cancellation of the nuclear phase-out decision of 2000 were selected. A total of 259 
news items were coded. The second analysis covered the first two months immediately 
following the Fukushima disaster (12/03/2011 to 16/05/2011). As media coverage in 
2011 was more frequent, we analysed a sample of this coverage by randomly selecting 
three days per week. To allow for a meaningful comparison between 2010 and 2011 
coverage, articles on the Fukushima incident were only included in the sample if uses of 
nuclear energy in Germany were discussed. The sample includes 243 news items. The 
two periods were chosen because both were characterised by frequent media coverage 
on nuclear energy in Germany.  
The coding instrument was created in two steps. In the first step, categories of thematic 
aspects and evaluative statements were developed based on existing literature. In the 
second step, the codebook was inductively supplemented. We coded seven categories to 
examine which thematic aspects of nuclear power were emphasised (table 1). 
Furthermore, we coded actors’ “evaluative statements on nuclear energy”. Every 
statement was coded based on the following three categories: actor, position (positive or 
  
negative) and reasons for the given position. In 2011, we used a nearly identical coding 
instrument; only a few adaptations were necessary. For example, in 2010, “evaluative 
statements” referred to statements for or against a runtime extension. In 2011, we coded 
statements for or against future uses of nuclear power. Consequently, the two items are 
not completely identical but are comparable in light of political discussions at the time. 
The reliability test revealed satisfactory results.i  
 
Results on changes in media coverage on nuclear power  
Regarding the accentuation of thematic aspects, we found some significant changes 
from 2010 to 2011 (table 1). The analysed media outlets emphasised issues of risk vs. 
security significantly more often in 2011 than in 2010. Coverage on protests and 
demonstrations against nuclear power also increased. By contrast, economic issues were 
discussed significantly less often after the Fukushima accident. We also found a 
significant but less pronounced decline in coverage on energy supply and environmental 
compatibility. There were no changes in coverage on renewable energies and climate 
protection.  
Table 1. Changes in the accentuation of thematic aspects in media coverage 
 
Regarding actors’ evaluative statements concerning nuclear power, some shifts, but no 
fundamental changes, in the distribution of actors were observed. In both periods, 
government statements dominated: 54 percent of all statements made in 2010 and 45 
percent of all statements made in 2011. However, their proportion declined somewhat in 
the interest of opposition politicians (2010: 17%; 2011: 23%) and anti-nuclear activists 
(2010: 5%; 2011: 9%). No changes were observed regarding the number of statements 
cited from the nuclear industry and the general population.  
  
We found significant changes in the actors’ positions on nuclear energy. While in 2010, 
less than one-third (31%) presented strong views against further use of nuclear energy, 
after the Fukushima accident, almost three-quarters (73%) argued for a nuclear phase-
out. This change is especially evident in statements made by governmental actors. 
While in 2010, only four percent were opposed to further use of nuclear energy, after 
the Fukushima accident, 75 percent supported a nuclear phase-out. Similar but less 
dramatic changes were observed for actors of the economic sector that did not belong to 
the nuclear industry. The only exception with respect to positioning trends was found 
for actors of the nuclear sector, who expressed overwhelming support for long-term 
uses of nuclear energy both before and after the Fukushima accident. Unsurprisingly, 
the groups that already expressed a clear position against nuclear power in 2010, 
particularly the opposition and anti-nuclear activists, remained critical in 2011.  
In addition to shifts in evaluative positioning, we found changes in actors’ justifications 
of their positions for or against nuclear power. Two findings are of note. First, the 
proportion of statements that were supported with substantiated arguments declined 
significantly from 50 percent in 2010 to less than one-third (32%) in 2011. Clearly, 
numerous actors considered it less necessary to justify their positions in the context of 
the nuclear disaster. Second, the thematic focus of justifications changed as well. In the 
context of runtime extension in 2010, most of the 348 statements citing arguments 
focused on issues of cost-effectiveness (44%) and supply security (25%). After the 
Fukushima accident occurred, cost-effectiveness was relegated to third place. 
Arguments concerned with issues of supply security remained prominent (28%), and the 
percentage of statements focusing on risk vs. security arguments increased considerably 
(27%). 
The repositioning of dominant key stakeholder groups also became apparent with 
respect to the thematic focus of their argumentation (table 2). In 2010, the government 
  
based its positions mainly on economic arguments. However, in 2011, issues of security 
and risk were used as justifications. Opposition groups based their arguments on energy 
supply and risk issues in both years, whereas in 2011, their focus shifted dramatically to 
arguments that emphasised the risks of nuclear power. The nuclear industry continued 
to focus its argumentation on economic arguments, stressing this factor even more in 
2011. Anti-nuclear movement actors’ arguments shifted from questioning issues of cost-
effectiveness to highlighting security risks. These tendencies were observed in all of the 
analysed media. While absolute and relative changes varied, the general findings are in 
agreement.  
Table 2. Changes in the thematic argumentation of key actor groups 
 
The detected changes in media coverage provide optimal conditions for strong media 
effects on peoples’ attitudes towards nuclear power. Due to the continuous and intensive 
media coverage and growing consonance in the actors’ negative positioning concerning 
the future use of nuclear energy, it was difficult for recipients to escape the media’s 
influence via selective media exposure. Therefore, we expect that peoples’ attitudes 
towards nuclear energy became more negative in 2011. In the following section (study 
2), this assumption is tested.  
Study 2: Changes in public opinion on nuclear power 
Methods and data 
To examine and explain possible attitude changes, panel survey data from 2010 and 
2011 were used. The first wave of telephone surveys was carried out before the runtime 
extension was enacted by the German parliament (16/08/2010 to 06/09/2010), and the 
second wave was conducted two months after the Fukushima disaster had occurred 
  
(15/05/2011 to 04/06/2011). A total of 341 individuals of private households 
participated in both panel waves. Survey participants (49% women, 51% men) were 
between 19 and 88 years of age (mean age: 52). The sample, which is representative of 
Thuringia, was selected using a two-stage random method (random-last-digit and next-
birthday) with the support of the German Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences 
(GESIS). To compensate for sample distortions, we calculated weighting factors based 
on the sex and age distributions of the basic population.  
 
To analyse changes in attitudes towards nuclear power, the standardised questionnaire 
included eight items that were used in both waves of the panel survey (table 3). Given 
the state of research and political debate in Germany at the time, attitudes towards 
nuclear energy were examined on three dimensions: a) the environmental compatibility 
of nuclear power, b) nuclear power security vs. risk and c) the “replaceability” of 
nuclear power with renewable energy sources. While environmental compatibility was 
measured using two items that focus on different aspects of the dimension, the security 
vs. risk and replaceability with renewable energy sources dimensions were each 
operationalised by three items. Using the six items of dimensions b and c, we conducted 
a factor analysis for both waves. As expected based on theory, two dimensions were 
identified.  
To explain individual differences in attitude change, the questionnaire also measured the 
following independent variables: age; sex; education; income; political interest; political 
left-right orientation; and energy policy-related preferences for environmental 
compatibility, cost-effectiveness or supply security.ii From a communication science 
perspective, it is especially interesting to examine whether attitude changes can be 
traced to differences in individual media use. We do not expect differential media 
effects due to consonant media coverage on nuclear power. However, it is plausible that 
  
individual (topic-related) media exposure and interpersonal communication and quality 
evaluations of media coverage on energy issues may affect the strength and direction of 
attitude changes. Given the presence of striking visual representations of the tsunami 
and exploding reactors in Japan, it can be assumed that individuals who use more 
visual-based media show stronger changes in the risk dimension which involves   
especially emotional aspects. By contrast, individuals with a stronger preference for 
newspapers show stronger attitude changes related to cognitive aspects (replaceability). 
To prove these assumptions, we considered five variables on media usage and 
evaluation.iii 
Results on changes in attitudes towards nuclear power 
The results regarding attitude changes, presented in table 3, indicate that in 2010, the 
missing solutions for the issue of nuclear waste disposal were recognised as serious 
arguments against nuclear energy. Furthermore, the argument that nuclear energy usage 
may serve as an appropriate strategy to address climate change was not highly 
persuasive for the majority of individuals. After the Fukushima disaster, these sceptical 
views of nuclear energy became even more negative. Security risk evaluation results 
show that in 2010, most respondents assessed nuclear power as being risky. In line with 
these findings, the replaceability of nuclear power with renewable energy sources was 
predominantly assessed as optimistic. After the Fukushima accident occurred, these 
critical attitudes grew significantly more negative on both dimensions and on nearly all 
items. 
Table 3. Nuclear power attitude changes on three dimensions 
Individual attitude changes and possible influencing factors  
While these general attitude changes were observed for the entire population, not every 
individual in the sample changed his or her mind to the same degree. In some cases, 
  
even opposing changes were identified. An analysis of the panel data revealed that 11 
percent of the respondents showed a decline in nuclear risk perceptions, while another 
15 percent had growing doubts regarding its replaceability with renewable energy 
sources. For approximately half of the respondents, no significant attitude changes were 
observed. Hence, growing risk perceptions and confidence in substitution observed in 
the aggregate can only be attributed to one-third of the respondents (i.e., those who 
showed significant attitude changes in this direction). Several respondents had not 
changed their mind because they already held extremely negative views of nuclear 
energy prior to the Fukushima accident, rendering it impossible to increase their 
scepticism further. Correlations between 2010 attitudes and attitude changes indicate 
that the more positively respondents evaluated atomic energy prior to the Fukushima 
accident, the higher their observed negative attitude change after the accident. These 
findings underpin the notion that in the case of the Fukushima accident, German media 
coverage was consonant so that selective exposure was not feasible, and thus attitude 
polarisation did not occur.    
To explain differences in individual attitude changes, we conducted four regression 
analyses, in which we tested the influence of nine non-media variables and five media 
factors. The results show that neither basic political attitudes nor energy policy-related 
preferences affected the strength and direction of attitude changes (table 4). 
Occasionally, some sociodemographic variables such as age and sex had an effect. 
Furthermore, few and rather small media effects were identified. Consequently, the 
changes in attitudes can barely be explained by sociodemographic variables and are not 
attributable to general attitudes. While intensive communication on energy issues 
resulted in stronger attitude changes in the expected direction, these shifts were 
weakened by negative evaluations of the quality of media coverage on energy issues. 
  
Overall, the explanatory power of the models was rather low, reaching a maximum of 
five percent. 
Table 4. Regression models for attitude changes from 2010 to 2011 
A more detailed analysis of the hypothesised and observed effects is neither necessary 
nor illustrative. The central conclusion of these findings is that changes in attitudes 
were hardly modified by the variables considered. At first glance, this finding appears 
unremarkable. However, the relevance of this finding increases considerably when we 
account for the fact that in a cross-sectional analysis with the data from 2010, the same 
variables can to some extent explain differences in individual attitudes towards nuclear 
power (table 5). 
The results show that individual differences in attitudes are especially influenced by 
basic political attitudes, energy policy preferences, and sociodemographic variables. It 
is remarkable that the same factors were irrelevant to attitude changes. Consequently, 
the significant effects of the cross-sectional study show that non-existent effects 
revealed through the longitudinal analysis are not trivial. Rather, they illustrate that 
media coverage on nuclear energy after the Fukushima accident evoked attitude 
changes that are independent of personal predispositions. This serves as an important 
precondition for strong media effects.  
 
Table 5. Regression models for differences in attitudes in 2010 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
The aim of this paper was to examine changes in media coverage and in public opinion 
on nuclear power in Germany as a result of the Fukushima disaster. Findings on 
  
changes in the accentuation of thematic aspects in the media revealed two trends (RQ2). 
In 2010, the media reported most heavily on economic issues and less often on security 
issues of nuclear energy. In 2011, however, the media placed considerably more 
emphasis on risk vs. security issues and less emphasis on economic topics. Furthermore, 
changes in the positioning and argumentation of key actors in the media were found 
(RQ3). The results show that the government and economic sector actors fundamentally 
changed their positions from predominantly nuclear friendly to predominantly sceptical 
of nuclear energy. Consequently, political polarization between opposition groups and 
the government in Germany, which was clearly evident in 2010, largely disappeared 
following the Fukushima accident. Along with this finding, we identified additional 
shifts in argumentation trends. In 2011, risk vs. security debates grew more important 
among all actors. Only the nuclear industry maintained an economically driven pro-
nuclear position. 
The panel data analysis further showed that these largely consonant changes (RQ1) in 
media coverage affected the population. We found attitude changes on three attitude 
dimensions, environmental compatibility, risk vs. security and replaceability of nuclear 
energy with renewable energy sources (RQ4). More precisely, the results show that 
evaluations of environmental compatibility, which were quite negative in 2010, became 
even more negative after the Fukushima accident occurred. Furthermore, we observed 
that the assessments of the security of nuclear power grew more negative, and that 
replaceability with renewable energy was evaluated more favourably.  
Our interpretation that these changes are indeed effects of media coverage is based on 
two findings. First, individual attitude changes were not substantially influenced by 
sociodemographic characteristics, political attitudes, or media exposure (RQ5). Second, 
the same individual predispositions that had no effect on attitude changes had an effect 
on the distribution of attitudes according to a cross-sectional perspective. Taken 
  
together, these two results lead to a plausible conclusion that the observed aggregate-
level attitude changes are a result of ubiquitous and consistent changes in media 
coverage on nuclear power.  
Theoretical conclusions and consequences  
A conclusive investigation of media effects on attitudes is quite a demanding 
undertaking. When media effects are analysed in experimental laboratory studies, 
significant doubts typically arise regarding the external validity of findings. Examining 
media effects in non-experimental field studies, however, is methodologically ambitious 
and not possible without the use of a combination of various types of data (primarily 
survey and content analysis data). In using cross-sectional data, it is assumed that issue 
coverage differences (e.g., nuclear power) among media sources lead to attitude 
differences among recipients of these different media. Longitudinal studies, however, 
largely ignore differences between media sources and tend to focus on the aggregate 
level. This approach presumes that long-term cross-media changes more heavily 
influence media effects and thus that differences between media sources can be ignored.  
The present study combines the two approaches. With the data used here, we examined 
individual attitude changes and changes in the media coverage of different media 
sources. The results showed that media coverage was largely consonant with regards to 
nuclear energy and, above all, that changes in the media coverage were rather uniform. 
Consequently, we expected uniform attitude effects that do not vary among recipients of 
different media sources. Indeed, we found significant attitude changes on all attitude 
dimensions, supporting the assumption that changes can be attributed to media 
coverage.  
  
For a theoretical classification of these findings in the context of media effects theory, it 
must be noted that in the present case, preconditions for media effects were almost fully 
realised:  
• The accident triggered extensive media coverage with a clear negative scope 
before the second survey was carried out in 2011.   
• The media reported ubiquitously and intensively on the issue. 
• Obvious and consonant changes in media coverage across different media 
sources were observed.   
• Whereas the media presented differences in the positioning of various actors in 
2010, these differences largely disappeared in 2011.  
• Alternative information sources, especially direct experiences and interpersonal 
communication, played no role.  
Despite these ideal conditions, we found only small attitude effects (approximately 0.3 
scale points on a 4-point scale). Thus, even under nearly perfect conditions for strong 
media effects, the observed impact was only moderate. Furthermore, it must be noted 
that only a minority of respondents changed their minds. Most respondents maintained 
their original attitudes, and some even switched their attitudes in the opposite direction. 
Taking these findings into account, it is not reasonable to assume that strong media 
effects on public opinion are commonplace, and they are clearly less likely when 
coverage is more diverse, as in this particular case.  
However, public debate on nuclear power in Germany has a long history, and many of 
the respondents already had relatively stable attitudes on the issue prior to the surveys. 
As established attitudes render attitude shifts unlikely, the observed moderate effects are 
quite remarkable. 
  
The political decision to quickly withdraw the runtime extension and the usage of 
nuclear power was supported with broad consensus in politics and in the media. In prior 
public discourse, and especially among the citizens examined here, nuclear power was a 
controversial issue. Changes in media coverage following the Fukushima accident 
reinforced this tenor, albeit slightly. The fact that only small effects were observed 
despite consonant reporting on the accident raises questions of whether these changes 
are enduring or whether people may simply change their views again. 
Many political decisions associated with the nuclear phase-out and energy policy 
change, e.g., the construction of wind turbines and additional power lines, are also 
highly controversial and accompanied by public protest. In addition, there are technical 
barriers to guaranteeing a secure energy supply that increasingly relies on fluctuating 
renewable energy sources. Furthermore, renewable energy usage is blamed for rising 
energy prices. For all of these reasons, political actors who call for a re-evaluation of 
nuclear power may find support from the population and the media. Even after the 
Fukushima incident, it is hasty to expect nuclear energy to fully disappear from the 
German energy portfolio. This was reflected in the respondents’ opinions in 2011, as 
nearly 60 percent agreed that the decision to phase out nuclear energy will end in 
failure. 
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i To ensure intercoder reliability, we calculated reliability coefficients using the Holsti formula (Holsti, 1969). A 
reliability coefficient of 0.74 denotes agreement in 74 percent of the codes. The following coefficients were 
calculated for the different categories: economy (0.74), energy supply (0.76), renewable energy (0.91), risk vs. 
security (0.84), environmental compatibility (0.88), climate protection (0.92), protests/demonstrations (0.89), actors 
(0.71), positions (0.72), and justifications (0.68).  
iiThe following variables served as non-media factors: age, sex, education, income, political interest, political left-
right orientation, and energy policy-related preferences. The latter are based on the following operationalisation: 
“Germany has various energy policy objectives that are all very important: a) cost-effectiveness, referring to cheap 
and competitive energy, b) security supply, denoting a sufficient energy supply at all times, and c) environmental 
compatibility, meaning that energy supplies should preferably cause little environment damage. Which of the three 
objectives is most important and which comes in second place?” Based on these items, measures of cost-
effectiveness, security supply and environmental compatibility were calculated.  
iii The following variables served as media factors: overall media exposure and media preference. First, the frequency 
of newspaper, television news, TV magazine, print magazine and online media use was assessed. Then, these 
indicators were combined into an overall index of media exposure and into an index that operationalises preferences 
for print or TV media. Energy-related communication behaviours formed an index constructed from the following 
three items: How often have you noticed news items on issues of energy, climate or the environment over the past 
year? How often have you purposefully informed yourself on issues of energy, energy consumption or energy saving 
over the past month? How often have you discussed issues of energy, climate or the environment with friends, 
relatives or colleagues over the past year? Responses were measured on a five-point frequency scale ranging from 
"never" to "very often". Evaluations of media quality were measured based on three items on a 4-point agreement 
scale, in which two dimensions were differentiated. The degree to which the media were considered informative was 
assessed based on two items (“The media report too infrequently on different energy sources" and "The media report 
too infrequently on new ways of saving energy"), and neutrality was assessed based on one item (“The media report 
too dramatically on issues of energy supply”). 
Table 1: Changes in the accentuation of thematic aspects in media coverage 
thematic aspects of 
nuclear power  
2010 
before runtime decision  
2011 
 after Fukushima accident  
% % p 
economy 73 52 <.001  
energy supply 62 51 <.05  
renewable energies 46 42 ns.  
risk vs. security 36 59 <.001  
environmental compatibility 15   7 <.01  
climate protection 17 13 ns.  
protests/demonstrations 16 28 <.01  
Sum of news items (n) 259 243  
Reading instruction: In 2010, the media mentioned nuclear power economic issues in 73 percent of the 259 
news items. In 2011, these references accounted for 52 percent of the 243 news items. 
 
Table 2: Changes in the thematic argumentation of key actor groups 
 government         opposition nuclear industry  
     anti-nuclear 
movement 
year 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011 
arguments (n) 165 53 23 9 31 15 15 7 
 % % % % % % % % 
cost-effectiveness 66 19 17 11 58 67 53 0 
supply security 26 43 44 22 36 27 33 29 
risk vs. security 8 38 39 67 6 7 13 71 
Reading instruction: In 2010, government actors used cost-effectiveness arguments to justify their positions 
on nuclear power in 66 percent of their 165 statements. 
 
Table 3: Attitude changes on nuclear power on three dimensions 
  2010 2011   
Operationalisation  n M1 M1 p  
evaluation of environmental compatibility       
As long as nuclear waste disposal issues have not been resolved, a 
runtime extension (2010)/longer usage (2011) is irresponsible.  329 3.4 3.5 ≤ .01 
 
Using nuclear energy is an appropriate strategy for tackling climate 
change. 164
2 2.3 2.0 ≤ .01  
evaluation of risks (index)  341 2.7 3.0 ≤ .001  
I am concerned about the safety of nuclear power plants. 337 3.1 3.3 ≤ .001  
I feel threatened by the use of nuclear power. 333 2.2 2.5 ≤ .001  
The risk of longer use of nuclear power is too big.  326 2.9 3.2 ≤ .001  
evaluation of replaceability with renewable energy sources (index) 337 2.7 2.9 ≤ .001  
Without energy from nuclear power plants, energy needs in Germany 
will not be covered in the long term (denial). 290 2.5 2.9 ≤ .001 
 
In the long term, renewables will be cheaper than nuclear energy. 258 3.0 3.1 .11  
In the next 20-40 years, we will establish enough renewable energy 
sources to disclaim nuclear energy. 328 2.6 2.9 ≤ .001 
 
Reading example (first line): Average agreement with the first statement increased significantly (p≤ .01) from 3.4 in 2010 to 
3.5 in 2011. 1Average agreement with a four-step agreement scale of 1 (‘do not agree at all’) to 4 (‘agree completely’); 2due 
to a split in the questionnaire, only a random 50% of the respondents were questioned on this item. Therefore the two 





Table 4: Regression models of attitude changes from 2010 to 2011 










number of cases (n) 336 324 328 163 
adjusted R² .05 .04  .05 .03 
 beta-coefficients 
sex (female) .13    
age (high)   .19 .17 
energy-related communication (intensive) .11  .11  
newspaper vs. TV preference (newspaper)  .16   
quality evaluation: informative (negative) -.15    
quality evaluation: neutrality (negative)  -.12   
Notes: All model coefficients are statistically significant at p <.05. 
 
 
Table 5: Regression models for attitude differences in 2010 
 evaluation of risks   
replaceability  
with 







number of cases (n) 336 338 301 165 
adjusted R² .23 .04 .12 .16 
 beta-coefficients 
sex (female) .19   .21 
age (high) .27    
political interest (high)  .12 .17  
political orientation (left)   .12  
energy political preference: 
environmental compatibility (high) .24 .15 .23 .23 
energy-related communication (intensive) -.13    
newspaper vs. TV preference (newspaper) .18  .13  
quality evaluation: informative (negative) .16   .19 
Notes: All model coefficients are statistically significant at p <.05. 
 
